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NOTES
OSHA REGULATION: WORKERS RIGHT TO REFUSE TO WORK IN
SITUATION OF IMMINENT DANGER HELD INVALID. -Marshall v.
Daniel Construction Co., 563 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 99
S. Ct. 216 (1978).
INTRODUCTION
On December 29, 1970, President Nixon signed the Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970 into law.' Although there was
extensive congressional debate, accord was reached on the necessity for
legislation in the wake of the death and disability toll on the' nation's
work force resulting from the introduction of increasingly
sophisticated technology and chemicals into the workplace.'
Congress declared the policy of OSHA in section l(b): "to assure
so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe
and healthful working conditions. . .. " Pursuant to authority granted
in section 7(g) of OSHA,' the Secretary of Labor promulgated 29
C.F.R. section 1977.12(b)(2).' This regulation permits an employee the
right to refuse to work
under ... circumstances then confronting the employee at the workplace
which would cause him to conclude that there is a real danger of death
or serious injury and there is insufficient time, due to the urgency of the
situation, to eliminate the danger through resort to regular statutory enforcement channels.'
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
2. See generally Gross, The Occupational Safety and Health Act: Much Ado
About Something, 2 Loy. CHI. L.J. 247, 247-51 (1972); Marinelli, OccupationalSafety
and Health Act: The Right of a Worker to a Safe Work Place Environment, 78 W. VA.
L. REV. 57, 57-61 (1975-76); Cohen, The Occupational Safety and Health Act: A
Labor Lawyer's Overview, 33 OHIO ST. L. REV. 788, 788-91 (1972).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976).
4. "The Secretary [of Labor] and the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare shall each prescribe such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to
carry out their responsibilities under this chapter, including rules and regulations dealing with the inspection of an employer's establishment." 29 U.S.C. § 657(g)(2) (1976).
5. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (1978).
6. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12 (1978) provides:
(a) In addition to protecting employees who file complaints, institute proceedings, or testify in proceedings under or related to the Act, section I1(c) also
protects employees from discrimination occurring because of the exercise "of any
right afforded by this Act." Certain rights are explicitly provided in the Act; for
example, there is a right to participate as a party in enforcement proceedings (sec.
10). Certain other rights exist by necessary implication. For example, employees
may request information from the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
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At least six district courts and one circuit court have reviewed this
regulation and with one exception all have found the regulation to ex7
ceed the Secretary's grant of authority under the Act. The Fifth Cir8
cuit, in Marshall v. Daniel Construction Co., held that it conflicts
with the intent of Congress as reflected in OSHA's legislative history.
This note analyzes that case and considers the statute, the regulation,
case law and the legislative history of OSHA to determine whether the
regulations expands OSHA's jurisdiction in an area where Congress intended to contract it.
FACTS
Jimmy Simpson, an iron worker employed by Daniel Construction
Company, was perched atop a steel skeleton 150 feet above the
tion; such requests would constitute the exercise of a right afforded by the Act.
Likewise, employees interviewed by agents of the Secretary in the course of in-'
spections or investigations could not subsequently be discriminated against
because of their cooperation.
(b)(l) On the other hand, review of the Act and examination of the legislative
history discloses that, as a general matter, there is no right afforded by the Act
which would entitle employees to walk off the job because of potential unsafe
conditions at the workplace. Hazardous conditions which may be violative of the
Act will ordinarily be corrected by the employer, once brought to his attention. If
corrections are not accomplished, or if there is dispute about the existence of a
hazard, the employee will normally have opportunity to request inspection of the
workplace pursuant to section 8(f) of the Act, or to seek the assistance of other
public agencies which have responsibility in the field of safety and health. Under
such circumstances, therefore, an employer would not ordinarily be in violation
of section 11(c) by taking action to discipline an employee for refusing to perform
normal job activities because of alleged safety or health hazards.
(2) However, occasions might arise when an employee is confronted with a
choice between not performing assigned tasks or subjecting himself to serious injury or death arising from a hazardous condition at the workplace. If the
employee, with no reasonable alternative, refuses in good faith to expose himself
to the dangerous condition, he would be protected against subsequent discrimination. The condition causing the employee's apprehension of death or injury must
be of such a nature that a reasonable person, under the circumstances then confronting the employee, would conclude that there is a real danger of death or
serious injury and that there is insufficient time, due to the urgency of the situation, to eliminate the danger through resort to regular statutory enforcement
channels. In addition, in such circumstance, the employee, where possible, must
also have sought from his employer, and been unable to obtain, a correction of
the dangerous condition.
7. Usery v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 424 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (upheld
the regulation). Contra, Marshall v. Daniel Construction Co., 563 F.2d 707 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3226 (1978); Usery v. Whirlpool Corp., 416 F. Supp.
30 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Dunlop v. Daniel Construction Co., Inc., C-75-26-N, 4
O.S.H.C. 1125 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Brennan v. Diamond International Corp., C-1-75-43,
5 O.S.H.C. 1049 (S.D. Ohio 1976); Brennan v. Empire Detroit Steel Div., Detroit Steel
Corp., No. C-1-74-345 (S.D. Ohio 1976); Aders v. Kennecott Copper Corp., No.
76-292-M (D.N. Mex. 1976).
8. 563 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1977).
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ground, fitting heavy steel beams into place with the aid of a crane.
The wind became so strong that Simpson feared he would be unable to
continue without jeopardizing his life. Simpson along with the rest of
the crew came to the ground, but the foreman ordered the crew back
up. Simpson refused and was fired. 9
Pursuant to section 10(c)(2)'" of OSHA the Secretary of Labor filed a complaint charging that Daniel Construction Co. violated Simpson's right to refuse work under 29 C.F.R. section 1977.12(b)(2) and
requested that Simpson be rehired with back pay. District court Judge
Henderson held that OSHA provided an insufficient legal basis for the
Secretary's regulation protecting an employee's refusal to work in the
face of hazardous conditions, and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted, and the Secretary appealed." The
court of appeals affirmed, over a vigorous dissent written by Judge

Wisdom. 12
DECISION OF THE COURT
The issue raised by the construction company was whether 29
C.F.R. section 1977.12(b)(2), which entitles a worker to refuse a work
assignment presenting an immediate danger to the employee's safety
provided no reasonable alternative exists, is consistent with OSHA.
The court noted that administrative regulations are entitled to a
presumption of validity and allocated the burden of persuasion to
Daniel Construction Company.' 3 In reaching its decision, the court
scrutinized the express rights of workers embodied in OSHA itself, and
found that workers have no right to absent themselves from work
assignments merely because they believe the assignment imperils theirsafety. "
The court then looked to see if authority for the regulation could
be logically implied from the statute. It found that although the regulation is not plainly inconsistent with the statute, Congress had considered and rejected a proposed amendment to the Act, the substance
of which is not embodied in this regulation. This proposed amendment
would have entitled workers to walk off the job with full pay when
9.
10.

Id. at 717 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(2) (1976).

11.

Marshall v. Daniel Construction Co., 563 F.2d at 709.

12.

A writ of certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court on May 26, 1977 which

was denied on October 2, 1978. Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Blackmun would
have granted certiorari. Marshall v. Daniel Construction Co., 99 S.Ct. 216 (1978).

13. Marshall v. Daniel Construction Co., 563 F.2d at 709-11.
14. Id. at 710-11.
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they were exposed to potentially toxic substances.II The court found
the regulation to be substantially the same as the rejected amendment
and held that the Secretary of Labor had gone beyond his authority in
promulgating this regulation.' 6 Therefore, the regulation was held invalid. 7
The dissent argued that a careful reading of the regulation and the
legislative history reveals that Congress did indeed reject a proposal to
OSHA similar to the regulation, but that because of the differences it
does not necessarily follow that it would have rejected the substance of
this regulation. The dissent distinguished the two, and found the subject regulation consistent with the authority delegated by OSHA. The
dissent would hold that the regulation is valid, and require Simpson to
be reinstated. I8
ANALYSIS

A.

Enabling Legislation

Because Congress realized that no statute could cover every con9
ceivable situation that might arise, it enacted section 7(g)' which entitles the Secretary to promulgate regulations to fill gaps where the
statute is silent. An administrative regulation, once promulgated, is entitled to a presumption of validity, and the burden of persuasion is on
those who would challenge its validity. 20 A finding that the regulation
is not clearly inconsistent with the enabling legislation, in the absence
of substantial countervailing considerations, will be sufficient to sustain the regulation. 2 ' Without exception, all of the courts that have
passed upon the regulation have agreed with this standard of judicial
review.2
The case turns on whether Congress intended the short term
remedies provided in OSHA to be exclusive. The two statutory procedures which deal directly with imminent danger situations do not indicate that they were meant to be exclusive. 23 Section 7(f)24 which provides for inspection by the Secretary of Labor or his delegate in immi15. H.R. 16785, 91st. Cong., 2d Sess., § 19(a)(5) (1970).
16. Marshall v. Daniel Construction Co., 563 F.2d at 710, 714-15.
17. Id. at 710.
18. Id. at 718-22 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 657(g)(2) (1976).
20. In Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965), the reasonableness of the
Secretary of Interior's authority to issue oil and gas leases was questioned.
21. Marshall v. Daniel Construction Co., 563 F.2d at 710, 716.
22. See note 7 supra.
23. Marshall v. Daniel Construction Co., 563 F.2d at 719 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 657(f) (1976).
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nent danger situations upon an employee's request, and section 1225
which provides for injunctive relief upon a finding of an imminent
danger, are ineffective to deal with a situation where time is of the
essence. In Daniel Construction Co. the remedy provided by the
statute would have required Simpson to file his complaint with the
Secretary, and then return to the job and wait for an OSHA inspector
to investigate. At best this procedure could take a matter of hours, at
worst several days. In the meantime to avoid losing his job Simpson
would have had to return to his precarious position atop the steel
skeleton.2 7 To fill this critical time gap the Secretary promulgated 29
C.F.R. section 1977.12(b)(2) which offers workers interim protection
while statutory procedures are pending.
The Secretary of Labor has conceded in the regulation itself, that
OSHA does not expressly afford employees the right to walk off the
job because of potentially unsafe conditions at the workplace.' 8 Here,
the regulation activates only when time is so critical that no reasonable
alternative exists to safeguard the employee's safety.2 9 Once this imminent danger is abated, the employee must follow the express statutory
procedure. 30
B.

Legislative History of OSHA

The majority of courts which have addressed the regulation have
dismissed the plaintiff's claims in rather summary fashion by holding
that the statute does not provide this remedy and that the Secretary
cannot expand his authority to grant this remedy where the statute is
silent. These courts reasoned that federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, specifically governed by Congress and that absent a clear grant
from Congress, the federal courts cannot claim jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Since there was not express grant of a remedy in the
Act which would confer subject matter jurisdiction on the federal
court, these courts held that an interpretative regulation issued under
the Act may not do so."'
25. 29 U.S.C. § 662 (1976).
26. Usery v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 424 F. Supp. 753, 758 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
27. Marshall v. Daniel Construction Co., 563 F.2d at 722 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
28. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(1) (1978).
29. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(1) (1978). This remedy can be used only when there is
"insufficient time ... to eliminate the danger through resort to regular statutory enforcement channels."
30. Usery v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 424 F. Supp. 753, 756 n.4 (E.D. Mich.
1976).
31. Dunlop v. Daniel Construction Co., No. C-75-26-N, 4 O.S.H.C. 1125 (N.D.
Ga. 1975); Brennan v. Diamond International Corp., No. C-1-75-43, 5 O.S.H.C. 1049
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The court in Daniel Construction Co. confronted the merits of the
regulation and rejected it on the ground that it conflicts with the
legislative history of OSHA in two respects. 3 2 The court found the first
conflict in the deletion of a provision in the proposed Daniels Bill,"
which entitled workers to absent themselves from the workplace with
full pay when the employee was exposed to "potentially toxic or harmful" substances." Ultimately the Daniels Bill was rejected and the
House adopted the Steiger bill, which did not contain this "strike with
pay" provision.35 In lieu of the "strike with pay" provision the House
provided a remedy whereby workers could request the Secretary to inspect the workplace immediately and issue a citation for any violation
of OSHA.3 6 Daniel Construction Co. reasoned that this regulation
allows an employee to do exactly what Congress considered and forbad: to walk off the job with full pay when the employee determines
that the work practice presents a real danger of death or serious
injury.'
The /dissent in Daniel Construction Co. and a district court in
Usery v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. disagreed. They were able to
distinguish 29 C.F.R. section 1977.12(b)(2) from the provision rejected
by Congress in the Daniels Bill. 3 8 The rejected provision in the Daniels
Bill shielded workers from exposure to potentially toxic substances
which may have impaired their health. 39 29 C.F.R. section
1977.12(b)(2) applies only when the danger to the employee's safety is
so immediate that resort to regular enforcement channels would be too
late to prevent a tragedy."'
In the former situation there is ample time to safeguard both the
employee's and employer's interests through an administrative determination that the substance to which the employee is exposed is harm(S.D. Ohio 1976); Brennan v. Empire Detroit Steel Div., Detroit Steel Corp., No.
C-1-74-345 (S.D. Ohio 1976); Aders v. Kennecott Copper Corp., No. 76-292-M (D.N.
Mex. 1976).
32. 563 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1977).
33. The Daniels Bill applied to "known or potentially toxic substances" and
shielded workers from exposure to them by providing that an "exposed employee may
absent himself from such risk of harm for the period necessary to avoid such danger
without loss of regular compensation for such period." H.R. 16785, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. § 19(a)(5) (1970).
34. 116 CONG. REC. 38,377-78 (1970).
35.
116 CONG. REC. 38, 715, 38723-24 (1970).
36. H.R. No. 1765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprintedin.[1970] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5234-35. Codified in 29 U.S.C § 657 (1976).
37. 563 F.2d at 712-14.
38. 563 F.2d 707; 424 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
39. See note 33 supra.
40. 563 F.2d at 719-20 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
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ful to his health. In the latter situation, unless immediate action is
taken the employee will be without a remedy.
Congress expressed concern that a legislative provision similar to
the Daniels amendment might be subject to abuse."' To dispell these
fears the regulation contains four specific safeguards. First, the
employee must attempt to obtain a remedy from his employer. Second,
he can only leave his work assignment if there is no reasonable alternative. Third, the employee is bound by an obligation of good faith.
Fourth, the employee must cooperate with his employer to remove the
danger before leaving the job site." These requirements may allay the
congressional fears of abuse that were expressed during debates on the
Daniels Bill.
Perhaps the crucial distinction is that the regulation does not expressly provide for pay, 3 while the Daniels Bill did. Opponents of the
Daniels Bill claimed that the "strike with pay" provision would upset
the government's neutral position in labor-management relations and
place an added burden on the employer." This argument is weak when
applied to the subject regulation because workers would be reluctant to
refuse work when they are not entitled to pay and face a possible loss
of a job if a subsequent determination finds the employee did not act
in good faith. Further, there is nothing in the regulation which would
prevent an employer from requiring his employee to perform alternative work until the dangerous condition is eliminated or while
statutory procedures are pending. 5
In sum, 29 C.F.R. section 1977.12(b)(2) is not the same as the
"strike with pay" provision in the Daniels Bill. Hence, this legislative
rejection of the Daniels Bill does not mean Congress decided the
remedy provided by this regulation was inappropriate.
The second event in the legislative history relied on by Daniel Construction Co. in arguing that Congress disapproved of the substance of
the Secretary's regulation is the deletion of a provision dealing with
41. 116 CONG. REC. 38,712 (1970).
42. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (1978).
43. The regulation itself does not provide for pay. See note 6 supra. However, if
an employee was discharged because he attempted to exercise any right afforded by
OSHA, the statute provides that the Secretary may bring an action in federal court to
reinstate the employee with back pay. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1970).
44. If the Daniels Bill passes as is, it will add more fuel in an already turbulent
labor force. Unions could, and would use the bill to disregard the no-strike provisions in collective bargaining agreements. Further, even if union officers were
against a local strike, "red hot" rank and file members could and would
disregard their contractual pledge.
116 CONG. REC. 38,393 (1970) (remarks of Congressman Michel).
45. 563 F.2d at 718 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
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'
imminent dangers.4 6 Senator Williams introduced a bill" that permitted the Secretary or his delegate to close down an employer's business,
if the danger to the employee was such that immediate action was imperative. This order could remain in effect for seventy-two hours. To
continue the shutdown the Secretary would have to obtain a court
order. Rejection of this provision was attributed to congressional
reluctance to vest such power in a lone federal inspector due to the
grave economic consequences that could befall a business ordered to
be closed. Further, vesting such power in one individual plants seeds of
abuse. 8 In lieu of the seventy-two hour administrative shutdown, the
federal district courts were given the power to issue injunctions." Congress concluded that only a judicial proceeding with all its safeguards
50
should grant such an extraordinary remedy.
In light of the above, the court in Daniel Construction Co. decided
that the regulation might have the same effect on an employer's
business as the rejected Williams amendment if enough employees
5
refused to work due to hazardous conditions. ' Since the Act requires
that a decision to shutdown a business be made only by a federal
district court, rather than by a nonjudicial officer it follows that this
regulation which allows a worker to decide when he may walk off the
job is contrary to the will of Congress.5
In contrast, the dissent in Daniel Construction Co. argued that the
regulation is directed at very limited individual action. It allows an
employee to refuse a particular work assignment which presents an immediate danger to the employee's safety when no reasonable alternative exists; an employee has no right to close down an employer's
business. The fatal defect in the Williams Bill is not present in the
regulation. Although this regulation might impose a burden on the
employer, it is different in kind from what Congress disapproved. The
corresponding benefit of preserving the worker's life is far greater than
the employer's burden.5 3
Finally, in Daniel Construction Co. the defendant argued that in
lieu of administrative shutdowns authorized by the Williams Bill, Congress granted workers the right to request an immediate inspection of

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 713-15.
S. 2193, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., § 11(b) (1970).
563 F.2d at 714.
116 CONG. REC. 38,369 (1970); Codified in 29 U.S.C. § 662 (1976).
563 F.2d at 714-15.
Id.
Id. at 715.
Id. at 720-22 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
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any dangerous condition at the workplace." ' The problem with the
right of immediate inspection is that it would offer no protection to
workers in situations such as that in which Simpson found himself.
Simpson would be required to remain atop the windswept steel
skeleton until an OSHA inspector arrived. At best an inspector could
arrive in a matter of hours. In the meantime the worker is confronted
with a Hobson's choice of his life or his job. 5
This regulation merely provides a remedy for this otherwise unprotected hazardous situation, and incorporates restrictions to
minimize the unreasonable interference with an employer's business
with which Congress has expressed concern.
CONCLUSION

29 C.F.R. section 1977.12(b)(2) is reasonably related to the enabling legislation in that it furthers the goal of OSHA to "insure so far as
possible safe and healthful working conditions to every man and
woman in the nation." 6 The Daniel Construction Co. dissent points
out that although the Act does not expressly provide for a procedure as
embodied in the regulation, it is a reasonable extension of the remedies
provided in the Act, and is designed to fill a narrow but potentially
deadly seam in the Act. Scrutiny of the legislative history reveals that
although Congress disapproved of certain bills that contained provisions similar to this regulation, this regulation was carefully drafted to
avoid the features to which Congress had objected. Nevertheless, the
Fifth Circuit reads the legislative history and the other remedies provided by the Occupational Safety and Health Act to reflect a legislative
decision against employee self-determination of imminently dangerous
working conditions.
Robert J. Cava
54.

Id. at 714.

55.

Id. at 722 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).

56.

29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976).
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